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I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Ascher makes a compelling case that federal law, and
especially the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code"), has eclipsed state
law as the predominate regulating force of the charitable sector.
Professor Ascher views this trend with trepidation-he criticizes the
Code for imposing a "frightening and bewildering array of often
draconian penalties" and for its failure to track preexisting state-law
concepts.
I agree that the combination of state and federal law creates an
impenetrable maze that charitable fiduciaries find overly difficult to
negotiate. Yet I am reluctant to finger the Code as the primary culprit.
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
1. Mark L. Ascher, Federalization of the Law of Charity, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1581 (2014).
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In my view, state law deserves much of the blame for its own demise.
For when it comes to legal issues at the core of charity law-the non-
distribution constraint and the charitable purpose requirement-state
law is a largely useless tool for guiding or disciplining charitable
boards. This failure is not solely attributable to attorneys' general lack
of resources or interest. The larger problem lies with the law itself. A
compilation of the fuzziest of standards, state law gives no guidance to
charitable fiduciaries. And charitable fiduciaries-volunteers with
good intentions but little time and few resources-are uniquely in
need of clear guidance.
Now, before you laugh, I want to assure you that I am not
holding up the Code as a model of clarity and simplicity. In many
respects, the Code suffers from the same failures as state law. But on
a few key issues, the Code has shifted away from fuzzy standards
toward bright-line rules. These rules explain both the line between
what is allowed and what is proscribed and the procedure that a
charity should follow to ensure compliance. For added reinforcement,
the Code imposes a series of tax penalties for noncompliance to ensure
that charities pay attention. This approach is superior to state law's
embrace of ineffectual, fuzzy standards that have no bite and may be a
contributing factor to federal law's recent ascent.
This Comment will focus on state and federal law's approaches
to two key issues. The first concerns the non-distribution constraint-
the charity's promise that charitable assets will be directed entirely
towards accomplishing the charity's mission and not distributed to
insiders. I will compare the state-law duty of loyalty to the Code's
excess benefit transaction regime, and show that the Code and
accompanying regulations do a better job of preventing self-dealing
and conflict-of-interest transactions that are not in the charity's best
interests.
The second issue concerns state and federal law limitations on
political activity. Although state courts have long agreed that a purely
political organization has no "charitable purpose," they have been
ineffective at describing exactly how much political activity a charity
can engage in while remaining eligible for state tax exemptions. On
the federal front, the Code contains a fairly clear prohibition on
campaign activity and gives charities that wish to lobby a road map
for avoiding penalties or revocation of tax-exempt status.2
Finally, I will briefly consider two states-California and New
York-that recently amended some nonprofit code provisions to
replace standards with rules. If this is the beginning of a trend, as I
2. I.R.C. § 501(h) (2012).
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hope it is, state law may once again become relevant.
II. SELF-DEALING AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
The defining characteristic of the nonprofit corporation is the
"non-distribution constraint"-the prohibition of the distribution of
profits to owners.3 The non-distribution constraint reassures donors
that donations will be directed toward advancing the charity's mission
and not into charitable fiduciaries' pockets.4  This promise
compensates for donors' inability to monitor the effectiveness of the
charity's performance.5 Any transaction between a charity and a
charitable fiduciary that is (1) not in the charity's best interest, or (2)
not on terms that are equal or superior to those the charity could
obtain in an arm's-length transaction, represents an inappropriate
diversion of assets to the charitable fiduciary in violation of the non-
distribution constraint. Understanding this, many charities effectively
manage conflicts of interest and would do so regardless of what legal
rules require. In these organizations, key directors and/or the
Executive Director ("ED") have internalized social norms against self-
dealing.
But when adherence to social norms is weak or nonexistent,
the environmental factors can combine to create an environment that
leads to poor decisionmaking. First, few market forces deter
opportunistic behavior.6 Second, nonprofit boards are uniquely
3. See Henry Hansmann, The Role of the Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838
(1980) ("A nonprofit organization is, in essence, an organization that is barred from distributing
its net earnings, if any, to individuals who exercise control over it, such as members, officers,
directors, or trustees."). Among other criteria, an organization can qualify for tax-exempt status
under section 501(c)(3) of the Code if "no part of the net earnings . . . inures to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual." § 501(c)(3).
4. See Hansmann, supra note 3, at 838 (noting that, for tax-exempt status, all net
earnings must be retained and devoted entirely to financing future services and projects).
5. See id. at 846-47 (explaining that the non-distribution constraint provides "additional
protection" for donors that are unable to ascertain whether "the service they paid for was in fact
ever performed, much less performed adequately").
6. Fiduciaries of for-profit corporate enterprises face a fair amount of market monitoring
that increases the pressure to comply with fiduciary duties; shareholders, share price, and the
market for corporate control all play powerful roles. Melanie B. Leslie, The Wisdom of Crowds?
Groupthink and Nonprofit Governance, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1179, 1202-03 (2010). By contrast,
nonprofits are not legally accountable to stakeholders directly-charitable beneficiaries are by
definition an indefinite class and have no standing to sue the fiduciaries. See Susan N. Gary,
Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Tax Law, 21 U. HAW.
L. REV. 593, 616 (1999) ("Any person served by the entity has an interest in seeing that it is run
properly, but no one person is likely to have the incentive, the ability, or the information
necessary to monitor the charity. Further, beneficiaries are unlikely to have standing to enforce
their rights as beneficiaries."). It follows that the only significant market pressure that a charity
may face comes from the need to attract capital. Sources of capital include donations from
1623
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vulnerable to groupthink-a decisionmaking process that occurs when
the desire to be an accepted member of a group becomes more
important than raising questions or challenging the status quo.7
Because board members are volunteers, they may be disinclined to
risk angering other directors or the ED by challenging consensus.8
This is especially true when boards are comprised of people from
similar social, professional, or economic backgrounds. And many
boards are, in fact, fairly homogenous.9
In addition, charitable board members do not often view
themselves as responsible for monitoring the ED.10 Unlike the
members of the for-profit board, who understand that the CEO
operates from self-interest, members of a nonprofit board may
(justifiably) attribute altruistic motivations to the ED. Nonprofit
directors are more likely to view the board as performing a supportive
function, with the goal of assisting the ED in accomplishing the
nonprofit's goals. This view might be encouraged by the ED, who may
members of the public, corporate and foundation grants, and government support. See CHARITY
NAVIGATOR, www.charitynavigator.org (last visited Oct. 24, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/8CLE-JPCH (showing sources of support for a wide variety of charities). But
funders do not have standing to sue for breach of fiduciary duty. See Gary, supra, at 616.
Although the Uniform Trust Code purports to grant standing to settlors of charitable trusts, it is
unclear whether this provision will have much impact on nonprofit governance, since most
donors fail to make donations in charitable trust form, and charitable trust settlors are likely to
be more focused on whether the trustees advance the trust's charitable mission. UNIF. TRUST
CODE § 409 (amended 2010).
Foundations and government agencies require various degrees of disclosure or
accountability as a condition for repeat giving, which may exert some pressure on the nonprofit
to refrain from self-dealing that does not advance the charity's best interests. See, e.g., Grants,
FORD FOUND., http://www.fordfoundation.org/grants (last visited Sept. 14, 2014) (explaining that
"[w]hen we make grants ... [w]e set benchmarks to measure success and monitor progress to
ensure that goals are being met"). It follows that the greater the percentage of government and
large-foundation grants, the more effective the monitoring. A study commissioned by the Urban
Institute shows that the level of a nonprofit's reliance on government funding is positively
associated with having an outside audit, a separate audit committee, a conflict-of-interest policy,
and a whistleblower policy. FRANCIE OSTROWER, THE URBAN INST., NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE IN
THE UNITED STATES: FINDINGS ON PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY FROM THE FIRST
NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE STUDY 4-6 (2007), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/
411479_NonprofitGovernance.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9Y72-GB7A.
7. Leslie, supra note 6, at 1183.
8. Id. at 1199.
9. Kathleen Fletcher, Building Diverse Boards, in PERSPECTIVES ON NONPROFIT BOARD
DIVERSITY, 15, 15 (1999), available at http://networks. seepnetwork.org/ppp-design2/doc/
Perspectives on nonprofit board Diversity.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/GJ42-SEE9 ("First,
new board members are typically recruited from among the friends, acquaintances, and business
associates of those already on the board. This system, of course, tends to make boards
homogeneous.").
10. The Urban Institute's study indicates that boards that focus board recruiting efforts on
friends and acquaintances of current board members did less well with every aspect of governing
except fundraising, on which recruiting strategy had no impact. OSTROWER, supra note 6, at 16.
1624
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view the role of board members as to fundraise or to lend their names
to a cause but may resent "meddling" by the board in substantive
decisions.
Information deficits are more pronounced in the nonprofit
setting. Volunteer directors have careers, families, other professional
commitments, hobbies, and social lives. Even the most well-
intentioned board members may find that conflicting demands result
in inadequate preparation for, or sporadic attendance at, board
meetings." The need to prioritize among conflicting demands can also
cause directors to adopt the least time-consuming approach to problem
solving. 12 There may be fewer stigmas attached to this behavior when
board members are volunteers. 13
Therefore, the law governing conflicted transactions in the
nonprofit context should compensate for the lack of monitoring and
board members' lack of time to devote to governing. It should seek to
implement (where absent) and support (where existing) the social
norm of subordination of self-interest in favor of the nonprofit's best
interests.
Rules are superior to standards for generating and supporting
social norms that counter the pull of self-interest.14 Because standards
do not prescribe clear limits of legal behavior, people who are self-
serving will interpret fuzzy information in ways that benefit them.15
11. Brody writes, "Nonprofit directors devote even less time and attention to their
positions. Such affirmative board duties as selecting the chief officer, preparing the budget, and
reviewing operations are likely to be carried out haphazardly or by only a few of the board
members." Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400, 1445-46
(1998). One writer stresses that, "[U]nlike for-profits, the board of many nonprofits consists of
uncompensated volunteers. These volunteer directors are usually very busy people who hold
other full-time jobs and simply do not have as much time to devote to their duties as most inside
directors of for-profits." David W. Barrett, Note, A Call for More Lenient Director Liability
Standards for Small, Charitable Nonprofit Corporations, 71 IND. L.J. 967, 967 (1996); see also
Harvey Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes,
Problems and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631, 633 (1998) (emphasizing that board
members who fail to become involved are "corrosive" to nonprofit corporations).
12. Of those charities responding to the Urban Institute's study, fewer than half were able
to state that their boards were "very active" at financial oversight and monitoring the boards'
own behavior. OSTROWER, supra note 6, at 13.
13. Leslie, supra note 6, at 1201.
14. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules us.
Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 55 (2000) ("[R]ules, because of their ex ante clarity, are
more likely to affect social norms than are more ambiguous standards."); Cass R. Sunstein, On
the Expressive Function of the Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2025-26 (1996) (discussing the
diminished influence of the law in the presence of established social norms).
15. See Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON.
REV. 1337, 1340 (1995)) ("The self-serving bias is less problematic in a rules regime where there
is, by definition, little or no ex ante ambiguity about legal boundaries."); Korobkin, supra note 14,
at 46 (citing Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of
1625
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In other words, they will determine that their behavior fits within the
standards of allowable conduct even if an objective observer might
disagree. 16
In addition, rules are superior tools for combating the
groupthink and ingroup bias that cause directors to subordinate the
best interests of the corporation to the self-interest of board
members.1 7 Besides clarifying the limits of permissible behavior, 18
rules can provide "cover" for directors who wish to fulfill their
fiduciary obligations but are afraid of sanctions that might attach as a
result of confrontation. Rules that prescribe a particular procedure
also benefit the corporation in a second important way: questioning by
directors is less likely to disrupt group cohesion-rather than a sign of
uncooperative behavior, questioning becomes part of the
decisionmaking process. Thus, by reducing the "costs of
confrontation,"19 clear procedural rules can replace norms of self-
interest with norms of questioning and debating.
A. State Law: The Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty
Most state-law formulations of the duty of loyalty are fashioned as
fuzzy standards. Cut and pasted from corporate law, these statutes
authorize conflicted transactions and shield fiduciaries from liability
as long as transactions are "fair."20 The Revised Model Nonprofit
Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098,
2101-02 (1979)); George Lowenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial
Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 150-51 (1993).
16. A standard requiring drivers to drive at a "reasonable" speed may lead a driver to
conclude that driving 90 miles per hour on a highway meets the legal standard, given his driving
prowess and his assessment of road and traffic conditions. Korobkin, supra note 14, at 46. Rules,
on the other hand, tend to minimize the effect of self-serving bias because they communicate
more direct information about he limits of allowed behavior and leave less to the discretion of
the individual actor. Id. If faced with a rule limiting the speed to 70 miles per hour, the same
driver would be unlikely to convince himself that driving 90 miles per hour was within the law.
17. See, e.g., JAMES T. TEDESCHI & SVENN LINDSKOLD, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 561-73 (1976);
Victor Brudney, The Independent Director Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 597, 612 (1982) (citing MARVIN E. SHAw, GROUP DYNAMICS 267-79 (1971)); Stanley Foster
Reed, On the Dynamics of Group Decisionmaking in High Places, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Winter
1978, at 40, 51-53) (detailing the pressure independent directors feel to conform to the viewpoint
of boardroom leaders and management).
18. As Professor James Fishman states, "If nothing else, explicit standards of care will
provide a clearer guide for conduct and will sensitize board members not only to their
responsibilities but to potential liabilities as well." James J. Fishman, Standards of Conduct for
Directors of Nonprofit Corporations, 7 PACE L. REV. 389, 413 (1987).
19. Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral Defense of Smith v.
Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 675, 688-89 (2002).
20. MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 215, 221-22
(2004). Thirty-five states have adopted this standard. Id. at 220; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 617.0832
1626 [Vol. 67:6:1621
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Corporation Act is a fairly typical formulation: it sanitizes a self-
dealing or conflict-of-interest transaction and shields directors from
liability for breach of duty21 if a majority of disinterested board
members, acting in good faith, authorize the deal, or if the board
ratifies a "fair" transaction after the fact.2 2 Even if the deal is
determined to be unfair, a director will not face personal liability
except in the most egregious circumstances.23 The fuzzy "fairness"
(2014) (providing that a transaction may not be void or voidable if it is fair and reasonable). Of
the thirty-five states, seven further require that the disinterested directors "reasonably believe
that the transaction is fair to the corporation." FREMONT-SMITH, supra, at 220-21. Still others
require that the disinterested board members approve the self-dealing transaction "in good
faith." See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-128-501 (2013) (providing for the validation of self-dealing
transaction ratified in good faith by disinterested board members).
21. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.31(a)(1)(ii) (2008).
22. Id. § 8.60(a)(1)-(3).
23. Id. § 8.31:
§ 8.31 STANDARDS OF LIABILITY FOR DIRECTORS
(a) A director is not liable to the nonprofit corporation or its members for any
decision to take or not to take action, or any failure to take any action, as a
director, unless the party asserting liability in a proceeding establishes that:
(1) none of the following, if interposed as a bar to the proceeding by the
director, precludes liability:
(i) subsection (d) or a provision in the articles of incorporation
authorized by Section 2.02(c);
(ii) satisfaction of the requirements in Section 8.60 for validating a
conflicting interest transaction; or
(iii) satisfaction of the requirements in Section 8.70 for disclaiming
a business opportunity; and
(2) the challenged conduct consisted or was the result of:
(i) action not in good faith; or
(ii) a decision:
(A) which the director did not reasonably believe to be in
the best interests of the corporation, or
(B) as to which the director was not informed to an extent
the director reasonably believed appropriate in the
circumstances; or
(iii) a lack of objectivity due to the director's familial, financial or
business relationship with, or a lack of independence due to the
director's domination or control by, another person having a
material interest in the challenged conduct:
(A) which relationship or which domination or control
could reasonably be expected to have affected the
director's judgment respecting the challenged conduct
in a manner adverse to the corporation, and
(B) after a reasonable expectation to such effect has been
established, the director has not established that the
challenged conduct was reasonably believed by the
director to be in the best interests of the corporation;
or
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defense has no bite-it provides little guidance and creates no
significant disincentive to engage in problematic transactions.
The corporate approach to the duty of loyalty may be tolerable
in the for-profit corporate context. Even if legal boundaries of
permissible behavior are less than clear, market pressures create an
incentive to put the shareholder's interests first. Institutional
investors can be vigilant monitors. A board that regularly engages in
transactions that undermine, rather than advance, the corporation's
best interest is likely to attract attention, which will negatively affect
share price. The market for corporate control creates additional
pressure. Fuzzy fiduciary duty standards give management room to
take risks, and the market provides a backstop. But the charitable
board faces relatively few, if any, market pressures that create
disincentives to self-dealing.
In sum, the corporate "fairness" standard gives little guidance
to charitable boards. Advance approval is recommended but not
required, and a board convinced of the "fairness" of a particular deal
may see no reason to jump through procedural hoops. Even if the
board does engage in an approval process, the law seems perversely
designed to allow boards to rubber stamp transactions.
B. The Internal Revenue Code: Excess Benefit Transactions
The Internal Revenue Code presents a more satisfactory,
though not ideal, approach to the problem of self-dealing and conflicts
of interest. The Code differentiates between private foundations and
public charities and sets forth different rules for each. Because private
foundations are subject to even less monitoring than public charities,
self-dealing rules are unusually strict-self-dealing and most conflict-
(iv) a sustained failure of the director to devote attention to ongoing
oversight of the activities and affairs of the corporation, or a
failure to devote timely attention, by making (or causing to be
made) appropriate inquiry, when particular facts and
circumstances of significant concern materialize that would
alert a reasonably attentive director to the need therefor; or
(v) receipt of a financial benefit to which the director was not
entitled or any other breach of the director's duties to deal
fairly with the corporation and its members that is actionable
under applicable law.
(b) The party seeking to hold the director liable:
(1) for money damages, also has the burden of establishing that:
(i) harm to the nonprofit corporation or its members has been
suffered, and
(ii) the harm suffered was proximately caused by the director's
challenged conduct ....
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of-interest transactions are flatly prohibited.
The rules applicable to public charities are more complicated.
Historically, the Code provisions addressing self-dealing and conflicts
of interest were just as muddy as state-based fiduciary duty law
standards. As a condition of 501(c)(3) status, and the variety of tax
benefits that come with it, the Code directs that the nonprofit shall be
run for public, as opposed to private, benefit.24 The Code also prohibits
private inurement.25 These standards were as problematic as state-
law fiduciary duty rules; they give little guidance and create few
incentives to comply. Because the only remedy for violating the
prohibitions was recession of tax-exempt status, the IRS invoked these
provisions only rarely and in extremely egregious circumstances.
In response to these difficulties, Congress amended the Code in
the 1980s to give the Service a more targeted tool for getting at self-
dealing. I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1)(A) imposes tax penalties on directors who
engage in or approve of "excess benefit" transactions-transactions on
terms greater than the charity could obtain through an arm's-length
transaction.26 It sets forth a schedule of excise taxes that will be levied
against directors who participate in or approve of an excess benefit
transaction, and levies an even harsher penalty if those individuals
fail to correct the transaction.
Expanding on this Code provision, the treasury regulations set
forth a clear procedure by which the charity can obtain a presumption
that the transaction was at or below market value.27 The presumption
24. The private benefit doctrine requires charities to abstain from conferring more than an
incidental private benefit on individuals other than insiders. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); Treas.
Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2008).
25. Section 501(c)(3) prohibits charities from engaging in transactions that result in
inurement of charitable funds to insiders. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012) (providing tax exemption
only for companies "no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual"); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2).
26. I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1)(A) (2012) (imposing penalties on "disqualified persons" who engage
in "excess benefit" transactions and on the manager who approves them and defining "excess
benefit transaction" as "any transaction in which an economic benefit is provided by an
applicable tax-exempt organization directly or indirectly to or for the use of any disqualified
person if the value of the economic benefit provided exceeds the value of the consideration
(including the performance of services) received for providing such benefit").
27. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6 (as amended in 2011):
26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-6 Rebuttable presumption that a transaction is not an excess
benefit transaction
(a) In general. Payments under a compensation arrangement are presumed to be
reasonable, and a transfer of property, or the right to use property, is presumed to
be at fair market value, if the following conditions are satisfied-
(1) The compensation arrangement or the terms of the property transfer are
approved in advance by an authorized body of the applicable tax-exempt
1629
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attaches if the deal (1) was approved in advance by a majority of
independent directors, (2) who gathered and considered comparability
data, such as research, expert opinions, and actual competing offers,
and (3) the board adequately documented the basis for its
determination that the deal was a good one for the charity.28
The excess benefit-transaction regime is a superior approach
to state-law duty of loyalty standards. In forthrightly requiring that
the board prove that a transaction is at market value or below, it gives
more guidance than the "fairness" standard. It sets forth a schedule of
tax penalties that will be levied if the board fails to meet the standard,
with more severe penalties if the harm to the charity is not remedied.
It provides guidance in the form of a road map that, if followed, will
enable the board to have confidence that it will not suffer penalties.
A charitable board that can satisfy the excess-benefit est will
also be in compliance with most state-law fiduciary duty of loyalty
standards. It is perhaps for this reason that the Code, instead of state
fiduciary duty law, has more of an impact on board performance.
III. POLITICAL ACTIVITY
Both state law and the Code cast a suspicious eye on charities
that engage in political activity and withhold certain tax benefits from
organizations that seek to achieve overtly political ends. Here again,
state law is so murky as to be worthless, while the Code contains
much clearer rules that are backed up with tax penalties to create an
incentive for compliance.
organization (or an entity controlled by the organization within the
meaning of § 53.4958-4(a)(2)(ii)(B)) composed entirely of individuals who
do not have a conflict of interest (within the meaning of paragraph
(c)(1)(iii) of this section) with respect o the compensation arrangement or
property transfer, as described in paragraph (c)(1) of this section;
(2) The authorized body obtained and relied upon appropriate data as to
comparability prior to making its determination, as described in
paragraph (c)(2) of this section; and
(3) The authorized body adequately documented the basis for its
determination concurrently with making that determination, as
described in paragraph (c)(3) of this section.
(b) Rebutting the presumption. If the three requirements of paragraph (a) of this
section are satisfied, then the Internal Revenue Service may rebut the presumption
that arises under paragraph (a) of this section only if it develops sufficient contrary
evidence to rebut the probative value of the comparability data relied upon by the
authorized body. . ..
28. Id.
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A. State Law
Although many states have no explicit prohibition or limits on
political activity,29 state courts have, from time to time, denied tax
benefits to organizations that go too far. These cases, however, fail to
provide even minimal guidance to charities.
Consider, for example, Michigan United Conservation Clubs v.
Township of Lansing.30 In that case, the Michigan Supreme Court
affirmed the Tax Tribunal's denial of the Michigan United
Conservation Clubs' ("MUCC") petition for a property tax exemption.31
The MUCC's principle purposes were to advance environmental
causes with an emphasis on conservation, to promote the sustainable
use of natural resources, and to provide educational programs on
natural resource conservation and environmental protection.32 To that
end, the group engaged in a number of significant activities that fit
the definition of "charitable"-distributing, at low or no cost,
publications explaining the value of conservation and the development
of natural resources; giving free public lectures on these subjects; and
conducting hunter safety programs in youth camps that were open to
the public. 33
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Tribunal's denial.34 The
court recognized that most of MUCC's activities qualified as
"charitable," and recognized that "[i]f this was the limit of petitioner's
activities, we would not hesitate to conclude that it is entitled to a
charitable exemption."35 But because the Court also found that MUCC
engages in a considerable amount of lobbying" and "clearly and
forcefully advances a specific viewpoint," it was not entitled to a
charitable exemption.36
The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed but modified the
appellate court's ruling on the ground that the court had erred in
using MUCC's lobbying activity as "the sole distinguishing factor" in
denying the tax exemption. According to the Supreme Court, "political
activity alone is not a valid reason for denying a property tax
29. See, e.g., N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 1-A (McKinney 2013); CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 86100-86118 (West
2014).
30. 378 N.W.2d 737 (Mich. 1985).
31. Id. at 738.
32. Id. at 739.
33. Id. at 742.
34. Mich. United Conservation Clubs v. Lansing Twp., 342 N.W.2d 290, 297 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1983).




exemption."37 Yet the Court failed to give any guidance concerning the
level of political activity in which a tax-exempt nonprofit could engage.
In a footnote, the court ineffectively grappled with the issue:
This does not mean that evidence of lobbying or political activity can never be relevant.
Evidence of political activity may or may not be relevant depending upon the facts of the
case and the type of exemption sought. Although the question is not before us today, we
surmise that certain forms of lobbying may preclude a tax exemption. For example, we
doubt that an organization whose sole purpose is lobbying would be entitled to an
educational or charitable exemption. Thus, we cannot say that political activity has no
relevance to a claimed tax exemption." 38
Other courts have taken a similar perspective. In determining
whether charitable organizations that engage politically can obtain
real estate tax or income tax exemptions, state courts consistently
decline to articulate a standard. Instead, they insist on a "case-by-
case" approach that considers political activity as an amorphous
"factor" to be considered.39
B. The Code: Lobbying and Campaigning
In some respects, the Code has always been more
straightforward. First, it classifies political activity into two
categories-lobbying and campaigning-and includes fairly thorough
definitions of each term. The Code treats private foundations
differently than public charities and prohibits private foundations
from both campaigning and lobbying. Public charities may not
campaign but may engage in minimal amounts of lobbying.
Historically, the lobbying limitations applicable to public
charities were fairly murky and no better than analogous state-law
standards. Since 1934, 501(c)(3) has granted tax-exempt status to an
organization if "no substantial part" of its activities consist of
"attempting to influence legislation." This formulation presented two
puzzles for courts: first, what activities constitute "lobbying," and
second, where is the line between insubstantial and substantial
lobbying? Courts developed no real consensus in their approaches to
these questions. In 1976, in response to criticism of the Code's lack of
37. 378 N.W.2d at 743.
38. Id. at 743 n.6.
39. See, e.g., Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. Dena' Nena' Henash, 88 P.3d 124, 141 (Alaska
2004) (affirming the lower court's denial of partial property tax exemption because the lower
court committed no error in considering lobbying activities and other factors to apportion the
property tax exemption); Minn. State Bar Ass'n v. Comm'r of Taxation, 240 N.W.2d 321, 325-26
(Minn. 1976) (upholding denial of state sales tax exemption to bar association whose activities
included lobbying, but not explaining how much weight it gave to lobbying activities in upholding
the denial).
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guidance, Congress enacted the 501(h) expenditure test, which sets
forth very clear spending limitations, keyed to the size of the
organization's operating budget.40 Charities must opt into the regime
in advance by filing a one-page form with the Internal Revenue
Service. Organizations that exceed the limitations are subject to tax
penalties. Organizations that regularly exceed spending limitations
may have their exempt status revoked.
Subsection (h) gives charities that want to lobby the ability to
plan and to protect their tax-exempt status. To date, no state court
has weighed in on whether compliance with 501(h) is sufficient to
allow the organization to keep its state sales tax exemption. It seems
reasonable to assume that at least some state courts will find that
compliance with 501(h) does not turn a charitable organization into a
political one.
IV. A TREND TOWARDS "RULENESS"? CALIFORNIA AND NEW YORK
If state law is to be more relevant, it must be retooled to
articulate clear procedural rules. Recent amendments to the
California and New York nonprofit codes indicate that the legislatures
of these states are cognizant of this fact. Both state codes have made
meaningful reforms to their fiduciary duty of loyalty rules, which are
steps in the right direction.
The most significant and most important change is that both
statutes eliminate the "fairness" defense to self-dealing. They require
the conflicted parties to fully disclose the conflict and the board to
approve the transaction in advance. New York requires the board to
determine that the transaction is fair, reasonable, and in the
corporation's best interest.4 1 With respect to transactions involving
only a conflict of interest (as opposed to direct self-dealing), New York
law now requires the board to consider alternative transactions before
voting and to document its reasons for entering the transaction in
writing.
California goes one step further and requires the board to
establish that, prior to authorizing the transaction, "the board
considered and in good faith determined after reasonable
investigation . . . that the corporation could not have obtained a more
advantageous arrangement with reasonable effort under the
40. Section 501(h) limits a public charity's lobbying budget as follows: 20% of the first
$500,000, 15% of the next $500,000, 10% of the next $500,000, and 5% of the excess over $1.5
million. The statute caps lobbying expenditures at $1,000,000 per year, which is reached when a
charity's operating budget is $17 million or greater. See U.S.C. §§ 501(h), 4911(c) (2012).
41. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 715 (McKinney 2013).
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circumstances."4 2 This statute essentially imposes strict liability for
self-dealing and conflict-of-interest transactions entered into without
the approval of the Attorney General or a majority of the disinterested
board members with full knowledge of the material facts about the
conflict of interest.43 This standard is quite stringent and
appropriately tailored to give guidance to charitable fiduciaries,
counter problems of groupthink, and create incentives for compliance.
V. CONCLUSION
If, as a matter of policy, it is important to ensure that tax-
exempt organizations devote charitable assets exclusively towards the
accomplishment of charitable purposes, state law must be retooled to
accomplish that objective. State-law rules should be formulated with
the charitable context in mind. They should be designed to clearly
communicate to boards the limits of permissible behavior, and offer a
procedure that, if followed, will ensure compliance with the legal
rules. Finally, penalties for departing from recommended procedures
should be clearly stated.
42. CAL. CORP. CODE § 5233(d)(2)(D)(i) (West 2014). In the alternative, subsection (d)(3)
provides the same safe harbor for transactions approved in compliance with subsection (d)(2)(D)
by a committee or agent of the board, if it was not reasonably practicable to obtain approval of
the board prior to entering into the transaction and if the board both determines that the
committee followed correct procedures and ratifies the transaction at the next meeting.
Id. § 5233(d)(3).
43. Id. § 5233(d). Subsection (h) of § 5233 provides:
If a self-dealing transaction has taken place, the interested director or directors shall
do such things and pay such damages as in the discretion of the court will provide an
equitable and fair remedy to the corporation, taking into account any benefit received
by the corporation and whether the interested director or directors acted in good faith
and with intent to further the best interest of the corporation. Without limiting the
generality of the foregoing, the court may order the director to do any or all of the
following:
(1) Account for any profits made from such transaction ...
(2) Pay the corporation the value of the use of any of its property used in such
transaction; and
(3) Return or replace any property lost to the corporation as a result of such
transaction ... or account for any proceeds of sale of such property, and pay
the proceeds to the corporation together with interest at the legal rate. The
court may award prejudgment interest to the extent allowed in Section 3287
or 3288 of the Civil Code. In addition, the Court may, in its discretion, grant
exemplary damages for a fraudulent or malicious violation of this section.
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